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Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age
of Legal Nostalgia*
Marc Galanter**
Men ever praise the olden time, and find fault with the present,
though often without reason. They are such partisans of the past
that they extol not only the times which they know only by the
accounts left of them by historians, but having grown old, they
also laud all they remember to have seen in their youth. Their
opinion is generally erroneous in that respect. . . .
Niccolo Machiavelli (1532)1
Lawyers, of the generation that I know, are apt to think their lot
cast in evil days. How often we hear that the profession is commercialized; that the lawyer of today does not enjoy the position
and influence that belonged to the lawyer of seventy-five or a
hundred years ago; that, instead of being an all-around lawyer,
one must now be a specialist; that the rules of law are less definite, and the decisions of the courts less certain that they used to
be; and that the last thing a lawyer need know, in order to success
[sic] under present-day conditions, is the law.
Lloyd W. Bowers (1904)2

No one watching the contemporary furor over the litigation explosion and lawsuits devouring America can fail to be impressed by
the power of folklore to overwhelm workaday organized social
knowledge.3 Time and again, the protestations of bean-counters
* Originally published in 100 DICK. L. REV. 549 (1996). © 1996 Marc Galanter.
** Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin Law School.
1. Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius
(Christian E. Detmold, trans.), in MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 271 (1940).
2. Lloyd W. Bowers, The Lawyer To-Day, 38 AM. L. REV. 823, 823-24 (1904).
Bowers (1859-1910) was general counsel of the Chicago & North Western Railway
Co. and Solicitor-General of the United States from 1909 until his death.
3. On the complex of folkloric beliefs about America’s “litigation explosion,”
see Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28
GA. L. REV. 633 (1994); Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate
on Civil Justice, 71 DENV U. L. REV. 77 (1993); Marc Galanter, The Day After the
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and skeptics are vanquished by stories about perverse institutions
peopled by malingering plaintiffs, greedy lawyers, capricious jurors,
and arrogant judges, proving yet again that it is not what is so that
matters, but what people—at least for the moment—think is so.
Tenacious belief may not make it so, but can have powerful effects.
In this essay I address another cluster of folklore about the legal system—one that belongs more to our professional discourse
than to the wider public debate, although it has its echoes there. I
propose to examine the prevalent notion that the legal profession
has fallen from an earlier condition of grace into an abject and debased condition. Many believe that lawyers, courts, and the law
once displayed an excellence no longer in evidence. Contemporary
discourse about law practice is laced by a sense of lost virtue and
lost amenity and infused with nostalgia for the good old days.
In the literature decrying the litigation explosion, for example,
America’s legal malaise is seen as part of a falling away from the
true America. This view mourns the loss of a time when society
was benignly self-regulating, law was clear, certain and reasonable,
judges applied it dutifully and eschewed activism, lawyers were upright paragons of civic virtue, and litigation was rare.4 Fables of
decline range from the lament of a Supreme Court Justice about the
imagined debasement of the caseload of the federal courts since his

Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
chs. 1-2 (1995).
These larger assertions about the civil justice system are embodied in oft-related
atrocity stories about outrageous claims and monstrous decisions. See Stephen
Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform,
52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 292-97 (1989); Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural
Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony and the Great American
Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, 11 STUD. L. POL’Y & SOC’Y 95, 104-08 (1991);
Steven Brill & James Lyons, The Not-so-Simple Crisis, AM. LAW., May 1, 1986, at
1; Fred Strasser, Tort Tales: Old Stories Never Die, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 39.
4. In Walter K. Olson’s The Litigation Explosion: What Happened When
America Unleashed the Lawsuit (1991), there is recurrent reference to “the old
legal system”—a normal orderly world in which the law was clear, judges were
restrained, lawyers were upright, and litigation was rare. Id. at 3; see also id. at
142, 145, 155-56, 168, 216-19, 340; PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988). Huber’s book is premised on the notion
that “we are living in an altogether new legal environment, created in little more
than twenty years, and profoundly different from what existed in this country and
in England for six centuries before.” Id. at 10. Huber makes references to the
more rational and benign conditions that prevailed under “the old law.” E.g., id. at
21, 23, 71, 96, 97, 116-19, 186.
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law school days5 to popular distress about litigiousness in a rural
county with little litigation.6
Of course, the lure of nostalgia is not peculiar to law. The
sense of painful loss and disaffection with the new pervades much
cultural criticism. Raymond Williams traced the centuries-long series of laments about the demise of traditional English country life
that was “‘dying out now.”’7 Reviewing a set of new books about
beaches, Jonathan Raban found the same pattern of the receding
Golden Age that Williams found in remembrance of country life.
An author under review, Raban observes:
Like so many other writers about the coast, . . . affects a tone of
routine threnody and his book takes the form of a lament for
yesteryear—for lost crafts and industries, lost places, lost people.
It’s always the conceit of such writers that the golden age of the
beach existed within living memory and that its fall from grace
has happened as a result of very recent industrial, social, or bureaucratic upheavals.8
5. Antonin Scalia, Remarks Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 15, 1987). But see Marc
Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; Or, the Federal Courts in the Good
Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921, for the evidence of misperception associated
with this view.
6. David Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 551, 551-52 (1984). Engel
studied a small Illinois county in which concern about litigiousness was high, although there was relatively little litigation. Id. at 551. Although contract actions
were almost ten times as frequent as personal injury cases, it was the latter that
provoked concern because they controverted core community values of self-sufficiency and stoic endurance. Id. at 574-75. Engel concluded that denunciation of
tort litigation was “significant mainly as a symbolic effort by members of the traditional community to preserve a sense of meaning and coherence in the face of
social changes they found threatening and confusing.” Id. at 580.
7. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY 9, 11-12 (1973). As
he pursued the trail back to the time of the Magna Carta and the Norman Conquest, Williams wondered whether
the timeless rhythm [lies] . . . in a free Saxon world before what was later
seen as the Norman rape and yolk? In a Celtic world, before the Saxons
came up the rivers? In an Iberian world, before the Celts came, with
their gilded barbarism? Where indeed shall we go, before the escalator
stops?
One answer, of course, is Eden. . . .
Id. at 11-12.
8. Jonathan Raban, On the Waterfront, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 14, 1994, at 39.
In an observation that might apply to many chroniclers of Golden Ages, Raban
notes that the author of the book in question “seems in this book to be a historian
with little interest in history, and his disregard for the past enables him to invent it
at his convenience.” Id.
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Commenting on the discourse of educational reform, Hanna
Holborn Grey recently observed:
The language of educational criticism . . . is most often that
of longing. The rhetoric of concern about higher education
stands as a surrogate for talking about a confusing and always
changing world, of sketching out the ideals of a better, more coherent, and once-stable universe. Yearning for the idyllic way
things were when one went to college, the wish that the place
would never change, the fear that it has done so; all this represents a common form of expressing distress and disillusion with a
threatening, uncertain, and mystifying world that now challenges
cherished beliefs and once-secure anchors, one that threatens to
repudiate the clarities and simplicities of a better time. . . .
The “golden ages” constructed in the service of educational
critique and reform float somewhere uneasily in a timeless stratosphere that is nonetheless asserted to have existed in a nameless
historical space.9

The decline of law from a noble profession infused with civic
virtue to commercialism has been a recurrent theme of professional
discourse. Distress about lost virtue has been a constant accompaniment of elite law practice at least since the formation of the large
firm a hundred years ago.10 Indeed, when the large law firm was
invented, just before the turn of the century, there was already a
sense that the profession had fallen from its former high estate and,
by too close an embrace of business, had become merely a branch
of business:
[The bar] has allowed itself to lose, in large measure, the lofty
independence, the genuine learning, the fine sense of professional dignity and honor . . . . [F]or the past thirty years it has
become increasingly contaminated with the spirit of commerce
which looks primarily to the financial value and recompense of
every undertaking.11

That very contemporary critique was published a hundred years ago
in the American Lawyer, not the intense monthly that since 1979
has chronicled and cheered on rapid change in the world of large
law firms, but a long-extinct legal newspaper of the same name published in New York from 1893 to 1908.
9. Hanna Holborn Gray, The Leaning Tower of Academe, 49 BULL. AM.
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 34, 35-36 (1996).
10. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 11, 36 (1991); Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
11. The Commercialization of the Profession, AM. LAW., Mar. 1895, at 84.

2017]

LAWYERS

IN THE

MIST

271

A century later, the 1990s has seen a remarkable flowering of
lament about decline and celebration of the profession’s virtuous
past. Within a few years we have seen the publication of Mary Ann
Glendon’s A Nation Under Lawyers,12 Anthony Kronman’s The
Lost Lawyer,13 and Sol Linowitz’s The Betrayed Profession14—to
mention just three prominent contributions to the genre.15 We are
surely living in the literary Golden Age of nostalgia for the Golden
Age of lawyering.16
Professor Glendon and Dean Kronman concur that the last
twenty-five years or so have witnessed a triple decline: in the judiciary, in the legal academy, and in the practicing bar—particularly
the bar’s elite large firm sector. It is the latter that I wish to address. Dean Kronman’s story is simple and straightforward: “For a
hundred years the large corporate firm has been the principal standard-bearer of the lawyer-statesman ideal in the sphere of private
practice” and the incubator of “a steady stream of lawyer-statesmen.”17 Until the “revolution” of the practice environment of past
twenty years18 changed their institutional character, the large corporate firm was the “primary carrier” of this ideal.19 But “today’s
12. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994).
13. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
14. SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION
(1994).
15. These represent the crest of a swiftly flowing tide. See, e.g., Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 949
(1995) (“The decline of professionalism . . . in the law, has taken on epidemic
proportions.”); Arlin M. Adams, The Legal Profession: A Critical Evaluation, 93
DICK. L. REV. 643, 652 (1989) (“The . . . most pervasive manifestation of the
change in the legal climate is the decline of professionalism and its replacement
with commercialism.”); Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business,
41 VAND. L. REV. 741 (1988); Lincoln Caplan, The Lawyers’ Race to the Bottom,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1993, at A-29. For a dyspeptic version of the declension
theme, see PETER MEGARGEE BROWN, RASCALS: THE SELLING OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1989). For the bar’s “official” account of the danger of commercialization, see AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT
OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986) [the “Stanley Report”].
16. Dissent from the Golden Age view rarely appears in print. For two notable examples from practitioners, see Milton V. Freeman, The Profession of Law is
NOT on the Decline, 96 DICK. L. REV. 149 (1992); John H. Pickering, The Profession’s Better Than Ever, EXPERIENCE, Summer 1995, at 22; cf. Richard Posner,
Barflies, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 31, 1994, at 40, 41 (“The profession was not as wonderful in 1960 as Glendon makes out. Many of the changes since then are improvements or inseparable from improvements.”). For a sanguine and eloquent
early twentieth-century response to lost glory laments, see [railway general counsel
and Solicitor General of the U.S.] Bowers, supra note 2, at 2 (quoted in epigraph).
17. KRONMAN, supra note 13, at 273.
18. Id. at 274.
19. Id. at 273.
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large firm offers an environment much less hospitable to the lawyer-statesman ideal.”20 Now, few large firms are committed to public service “except in the most begrudging and mechanical way.”21
So the lawyer who wishes to live a life centered on the values of the
vanishing lawyer-statesman ideal is advised to avoid elite corporate
practice in favor of “the general-practice law firm in a small town or
city outside the country’s largest metropolitan centers.”22
Professor Glendon’s favored period overlaps with Dean
Kronman’s, but she explicitly rejects the golden character of much
of the period that Dean Kronman extols. The early decades of the
large law firm fail to qualify as markedly superior to the present:
[I]f one’s benchmark for corporate firms is the palmy days at the
turn of the century when lawyers were using every tactic in the
book (and many that were not) to help clients bust unions, consolidate monopolies, drive competitors out of business, and obtain favorable treatment from judges and legislators, it would be
hard to demonstrate a marked ethical decline.23

She locates the profession’s Golden Age in the forty-year period
from 1920 to 1960:24 when lawyers were “widely oriented . . . to a
common set of ideals;”25 bar leaders consistently affirmed concepts
of professionalism; associates who did good work were ordinarily
rewarded with partnerships; lawyers would subordinate considerations of economic gain to “firm solidarity or to ideals of right
conduct.”26
Surely these fine features graced the profession then—but also
present were many of the nasty things that in her account have become dominant since the 1960s. There was probably—and I think
she agrees with this—more corruption then.27 And elite law practice was disfigured by systematic exclusionary practices—a blemish
she feels has been overcome and does not cancel out the genuine
professional felicity achieved in that period.28
20. Id. at 283.
21. Id. at 378.
22. KRONMAN, supra note 13, at 379.
23. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 57.
24. In fairness, she avoids the locution “Golden Age” although clearly identifying the period of superior virtue and amenity as roughly 1920 to the early 1960s.
Id. at 34-37. As one who enjoys jousting with promoters of Golden Ages, I am
deeply grateful for her specificity and her eschewing of the wiggle room to be had
by positing a Golden Age that elastically expands and contracts.
25. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 35.
26. Id. at 37.
27. Cf. id. at 72.
28. Glendon minimizes the thrust of exclusion, for the legal establishment of
her Golden Age did not simply decline to accept Jews, women, and Blacks in their
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Things have gone awry in the past generation. Since Professor
Glendon is fully aware that all was not wonderful in those earlier
times nor are they entirely nasty now,29 this is a judgment about the
central tendency of law practice—or at least elite law practice—in
two periods of time.
Here we see the perils of the Golden Age style of argument.
Sorting out the mixed bags of evidence about Period A and Period
B, it is tempting to solve the tricky problem of detecting those central tendencies by proceeding on the basis that nobility is of the
essence for Period A; the imperfections and abuses we find are regrettable dross, but do not alter the essential character of practice.
For Period B, however, the imperfections and abuses reveal the essential character and occasional flashes of the noble and elevated
are sports or vestiges of a better time.
Basically the Golden Age is an essentialist argument, wellsuited to produce vivid contrasts and to suppress continuities. Typically, such an account emerges not from independent examination
of the past but from the polemical thrust of a critique of the present. Its presentation may involve a number of specific techniques.
One is the selective invocation of great exemplars, comparing the
giants that strode the earth in those days with the at best ordinary
creatures of today. Thus, Professor Glendon uses not only John W.
Davis but Abraham Lincoln to characterize the virtues of lawyers in
the Golden Age and Oliver Wendell Holmes to illustrate its intellectual honesty.30
As the invocation of Lincoln suggests, another common accompaniment of Golden Ageism is temporal displacement. For example, describing the origins of discovery Professor Glendon notes:
“But attorneys representing economically powerful clients now regularly use these devices to outwait and outspend their opponents as
well as to obtain pertinent information.”31
She illustrates this with a well-known story about Cravath partner Bruce Bromley:
The Diaghilev of discovery . . . [who] once boasted to an
audience of Stanford law students, “I was born, I think, to be a
own firms, but fostered and supported extended campaigns to keep the wrong
sorts of people out of the profession entirely. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA ch. 4 (1976).
29. Thus, she provides an interesting set of accounts of contemporary practitioners who have experienced immense gratification exerting themselves for clients
in unusual ways. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 95-98.
30. Id. at 86.
31. Id. at 56 (emphasis supplied).
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protractor. . . . I would take the simplest antitrust cases and protract for the defense almost to infinity. . . . [One case] lasted 14
years. . . . We won that case, and, as you know, my firm’s meter
was running all the time—every month for 14 years.”32

Surely a sad commentary on the ethics of the corporate bar. But
what does it tell us about decline from the Golden Age? Professor
Glendon picks up the Bromley quote from a 1978 Time Magazine
article.33 But Bromley (1893-1980) gave the Stanford talk in 1958,34
when he was 65. He is describing events over the course of a career
that pretty much spanned Professor Glendon’s Golden Age. Perhaps Bromley, who rose to be a leading light at the firm that as
much as any exemplified the Golden Age, was a deviant case. But
how can we tell what is typical and what is deviant?
At least some contemporaneous observers back in the Golden
Age had a very different take on the virtue of the corporate bar. In
1934, Harlan Fiske Stone, hardly a romantic enemy of the established order, deplored the commercialization and deprofessionalization of the big-firm lawyer in terms that resonate with Professor
Glendon’s (and Dean Kronman’s) assessment of contemporary
practice:
More and more the amount of his income is the measure of success. More and more he must look for his rewards to the material satisfactions derived from profits as from a successfully
conducted business, rather than to the intangible and indubitably
more durable satisfactions which are to be found in a professional service more consciously directed toward the advancement
of the public interest . . . . [I]t has made the learned profession of
an earlier day the obsequious servant of business and tainted it
with the morals and manners of the marketplace in its most antisocial manifestations.35

Another observer of the profession in those days was Karl
Llewellyn, Professor Glendon’s (and my) teacher and the subject of
her moving tribute to him as a champion of the common law and
the tradition of lawyerly craftsmanship.
32. Id.
33. Id. The source is cited on page 301. Coincidentally, in The Litigation Explosion, anti-litigation publicist Walter Olson also relies on the Time Magazine
source to project Bromley’s account of half-a-century ago as evidence of novel
conditions in the recent past. OLSON, supra note 4, at 231, 366.
34. Bruce Bromley, Judicial Control of Antitrust Cases, 23 F.R.D. 417 (1958).
35. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6
(1934).
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In 1933, Llewellyn published a wide-ranging survey of the
world of law practice in which appreciation of the skill and ingenuity of the corporate bar is combined with condemnation of its narrow business perspective and the “lopsided” development of the
law resulting from the concentration of the most talented in the service of corporations.
Most of [the bar’s] best brains . . . [are] in the service of large
corporations. They are the ablest of legal technicians. I doubt if
the world has ever known abler. But their main work is in essence the doing of business.
....
. . . [T]he practice of corporation law not only works for business
men toward business ends, but develops within itself a business
point of view. . . .36
Corporation law practice becomes itself a business. . . . [A]bove
all [the senior lawyer] is, and he is valued as, a business-getter.
The measure of him is the business he can summon from the
vasty corporation deep. . . . He cashes in, then, as an enterpriser,
putting his own label on the work of others.37
Their work, their interest, and their outlook drive them into lack
of social perspective. They rival both the technical proficiency
and the insight into the country’s legal needs of the Great Brass
Brain that calculates the tides. Where we need vision, there is
vacuum.38

Of course, Stone and Llewellyn are using these descriptions to
flog the lawyers of their day, as our contemporary critics are flogging those of the present day. But the accounts of these observers
raise a series of difficult questions: Was the large corporate firm
ever the prime carrier of the ideal of public service? Has there really been a decline in the profession’s devotion to public service?
How much has the mix of business and service motivations
changed?39 Has there been a change in the extent to which corporate litigators play hardball? It is fair to say that once we abandon
the essentialist Golden Age/Fallen Age frame, we just don’t know.
36. Karl Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes—With What Results?, 167 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. 177, 177 (1933).
37. Id. at 177-78.
38. Id. at 179.
39. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 12, at 67 (characterizing the elite bar of the
Golden Age as suffused with a “trader” rather than a “raider” mentality (in Jane
Jacobs’s metaphorical usage)).
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One reason such comparisons are difficult is that information
about law practice in the Golden Age was much more restricted
than in the present period. In the late 1970s, there was a sudden and
dramatic expansion in the availability of information about law
practice.40 With the growth of a more intrusive and candid legal
journalism, more ample directories, and more penetrating scholarly
research, information about the earnings, fees, clients, internal
politics, and business strategies of law firms became accessible beyond a narrow circle of insiders. Earlier there were occasional
flashes that momentarily illumined the Stygian darkness—like
Bruce Bromley’s candid revelations—but on the whole lawyers
were shrouded by norms of reticence and confidentiality. Today,
the glare of publicity exposes lawyers’ work and wiles. Whether
lawyers’ conduct has worsened remains unknown, but what surely
has declined is the opportunity for lawyers to hide beneath the
wraps of confidentiality, free of any external scrutiny. So it is difficult to distinguish how much has changed in what lawyers are doing
and how much in what Steve Brill is making us unable to ignore.
Another confounding factor is the change in scale of the legal
world.41 If we accept large firms as an admittedly rough surrogate
for elite “big time” lawyering, we see that during Professor Glendon’s Golden Age elite practice involved only a few thousand lawyers;42 fifty years later over 100,000 lawyers were practicing in firms
larger than fifty lawyers.43 However one assesses the quality of
their contributions, it would be surprising if there were not many
more Warren Christophers and Lloyd Cutlers engaged in public
service today than there were Elihu Roots and Henry Stimsons
then. That a much higher proportion of lawyers (or elite lawyers)
were engaged in disinterested public service in the good old days
40. On the “new information order of the law,” see GALANTER & PALAY,
supra note 10, at 68-75.
41. On the growth of the various dimensions of the legal world, see Marc
Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalisation Around the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L.
REV. 1 (1992).
42. Well on in Professor Glendon’s Golden Age, Fortune estimated that
“about 100 U.S. law firms have a dozen or more partners each. For every partner
there are usually three hired lawyers.” The U.S. Bar, FORTUNE, May 1949, at 90,
172 (The three-to-one associate to partner ratio is almost surely an overstatement.). In 1957, as her Golden Age drew to a close, there were some 38 firms in
the United States with 50 or more lawyers. ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET
LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 43 (1969). In 1991, there were 749
firms with 51 or more lawyers. BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON,
AMERICAN BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION IN THE 1990S 16 (1994).
43. There were 105,236 lawyers in firms of 51 or more in 1991. CURRAN &
CARSON, supra note 42, at 25.
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seems highly unlikely. A sense of professional obligation to provide legal services pro bono publico is far more evident today than
it was during Professor Glendon’s Golden Age. As one 1940 graduate, looking back on changes in the profession, observed: “During
my law school days I cannot remember ever hearing the words ‘pro
bono’ or any reference to a professional obligation to give free public service.”44
Suppose for the moment that we were to concede that the style
and satisfactions of law practice have deteriorated. Would it make
any difference to anyone other than lawyers themselves? The subtitle of Professor Glendon’s book, “How the Crisis in the Legal Profession Is Transforming American Society” advances a strong claim
that American society is much affected by “the crisis of the legal
profession.” But here “legal profession” is used in the wider sense,
encompassing judges and academics, as well as the practicing bar.
The crisis in all three manifests itself as the ascendancy—or at least
the sustained eruption—of legal romanticism. “What is novel is the
rise in visibility, power, and prestige of lawyers, judges, and scholars
who are in open revolt against traditional conceptions of their
roles.”45 We have undergone an “extended orgy of legal hubris.”46
“[I]innovators and iconoclasts with shallow roots in legal traditions
and poor grounding in normal legal science” have arrogantly
flouted ideals of evenhandedness in judging, and have engaged in
shoddy advocacy scholarship.47 The invocation of settled traditions
and normal legal science colors the past with a harmony and consensus that was only part of the contemporary experience. In the
very midst of her Golden Age:
For elite corporate lawyers who saw the events of the times as a
nightmare come true, law professors and teachers were the enemy. . . . Law teachers were portrayed by some of the bar’s leaders as “dangerous academic theorists” who “refused allegiance”
to the American Constitution and form of government and who
threatened “the safety and security of constitutional government.” . . . [E]lite law teachers were conceived of as subversive
“liberals” who harbored ideas resembling those of Karl Marx and
as “dangerous academic theorists” who pretended “to sit in judg-

44. Pickering, supra note 16, at 30. The emergence and growth of structured
pro bono activity in law firms is described in the several contributions to Robert A.
Katzmann’s The Law Firm and the Public Good (1995).
45. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 283.
46. Id. at 288.
47. Id. at 288, 290.
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ment not only upon decisions of the Supreme Court but upon the
relative merits of the judges.”48

Prominent among the “dangerous academic theorists” of that day
was Karl Llewellyn, who now deservedly serves as Professor Glendon’s scholarly ideal and her model of “appetite and energy for creative problem solving.”49
As I read Professor Glendon, the sins of the contemporary
practicing bar are relatively venial, only part of a larger “crumbling
of civil society” that has released “tides of opportunism.”50 Practicing lawyers, it seems, are less perpetrators of the crisis than victims
of the arrogance of the disdainful knowledge classes.51 The real villains that Professor Glendon is exercised about are judges who are
assertive, arrogant, and activist, rather than restrained and evenhanded, and academics who abandon disinterested inquiry for advocacy scholarship.
But of course the Golden Age itself is as much advocacy as it is
history. What does its enduring appeal tell us about our legal culture? What does its current flowering tell us about the changes our
legal order is undergoing? Golden Age arguments conscript the
emotional power of the personal sense of loss that is part of our life
cycle. In the accounts of Dean Kronman and Professor Glendon, as
in a long series of earlier accounts, the time when virtue prevailed is
just over the receding horizon of personal experience. The sense of
decline mirrors the common personal experience of a gap between
aspirations and practice: in the flesh, working life is experienced as
more mundane, routine, business-like, commercial, money-driven,
client-dominated, and conflict-laden than it is supposed to be. It is
easy to believe that the way it is supposed to be is the way that it
used to be.
But if it were just a reflex of biography, we would expect legal
nostalgia to be uniformly distributed. In the course of interviewing
solicitors in large firms in London, where the world of law practice
has gone through equally dramatic structural changes in the past
twenty years, I have been struck by the entire absence there of the
expressions of loss and regret that are so common among observers
of the American legal scene.52
48. RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN
NEW DEAL 133 (1995).
49. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 194.
50. Id. at 100.
51. Cf. id. at 283 (“self-appointed vanguard of an aspiring oligarchy”).
52. I have no systematic evidence, but I have the impression that some sections of the American legal world—women and minority lawyers, plaintiffs’ law-
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Why are Americans more susceptible to Golden Age angst?
Perhaps it is because we have such exalted aspirations for law and
lawyers. We are all familiar with the oft-repeated observation of
Alexis de Tocqueville that “[i]t is at the bar or the bench that the
American aristocracy is found.”53 Chroniclers of the Golden Age
lament the fall from aristocratic virtue. But admiration for the public ideals that lie at the center of the aristocratic vision should not
blind us to the partial and flawed character of their earlier institutional incarnation. Nor should appreciation of the attainments of
the profession eclipse our awareness of the new tasks facing lawyers
in a world increasingly dominated by large formal organizations.54
Our growing social knowledge about law suggests a more
nuanced and ironic response. It is long past time to abandon the
essentialism that makes the past good and the present bad—or vice
versa. And it is important to enlarge our concern to consider not
only the satisfaction and fulfillment of lawyers but the way that different professional arrangements effect the law and its users and
consumers. Once the latter come into the picture, we may have a
very different view of earlier arrangements and recent changes.
The flowering of the large law firm represented the development of
a new level of proficiency in providing legal services. But it also
marked the emergence of what John Heinz and Edward Laumann
call “the two hemispheres of the profession,”55 one consisting of
lawyers in small practices serving individuals, and the other of lawyers in large firms providing more elaborate lawyering to large organizations (corporations, unions, governments).56 The increasing
proficiency of lawyers fostered by the organization of large firms
has been accompanied by a spectacular increase in the disparity in
the availability and quality of legal services between organizations
and natural persons. In recent decades, the sections of the bar that
service individuals have shared in the gains in proficiency. But as
law has become more complex and technical, using it has become
prohibitively expensive for almost all natural persons, especially
yers, ADR practitioners, law and economics types, feminist legal theorists, to
mention just a few—are less susceptible to the charms of the good old days.
53. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 288 (1959), quoted
in GLENDON, supra note 12, at 280 (different translation).
54. Cf. James S. Coleman, The Rational Reconstruction of Society: 1992 Presidential Address, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1992).
55. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND./AMERICAN BAR FOUND., CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319
(1982).
56. Cf. Marc Galanter, Mega-law and Mega-lawyering in the Contemporary
United States, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND
OTHERS 152-76 (R. Dingwall & P. Lewis eds., 1983).
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when contending with organizations. The professional achievement
of lawyers will depend far less on recapturing the imagined felicity
of the good old days than on their response to the challenge of providing remedies and protections to individuals and publics in a
world of large organizations.

